When we say that someone is a moral example, what exactly do we mean? How skilled are we at discerning the supposed moral virtue to be emulated? These are questions that I was prompted to consider recently while reading some European fiction and that I think are of abiding relevance.
In the Foreward to his delightful novel Manon Lescaut (rev. 1753; orig. 1731), Abbé Prévost describes “the subject of the picture I will present” as “an ambiguous character, a mixture of virtues and vices, a perpetual contrast between good impulses and bad actions.” Prévost envisions the narrative “as an aid to moral instruction.” Specifically, one “will see, in Des Grieux’s conduct, a terrible example of the power of passions…” (Manon Lescaut, 3, although Prévost’s sincerity here is questionable given the text’s history of censorship). What remains narratively ambiguous is the nature, or content, of the moral instruction supposedly intended. Is it traditional or unusual? Without resolving that question, it seems to me that in seeking empathy from other characters Des Grieux highlights how feelings influence, and usually soften, moral judgment.
