Making Sense of Wilson, pt. 8: Gender

The pertinent question is an old one:  how do natural differences between men and women manifest themselves in their respective moral senses? 

Upfront in exploring this question we should note that any answer will be sex-related, but not necessarily sexist.  Too often when exploring sex (or gender) distinctions, any discussion is seen as discriminatory in the bad sense (derogatory suppression) rather than in the neutral or even good sense (clarifying differentiation).  The same thing often happens when race is discussed, although what is race-related is not necessarily racist. 

Now, if the human senses that Prof. Wilson describes in The Moral Sense (sympathy, fairness, self-control, and duty) are integral to human nature, then both men and women should possess them all.  But in what ways, and to what extent?

Consider fairness, which we have addressed in prior posts (most recently, e.g., here and here).  Based on observations recorded over many hours in various studies, Prof. Wilson summarizes the different, general manifestations of fairness across gender lines in this way:  “To oversimplify, men will be more likely to value equity, women equality” (188).  He explains further: 

It [fairness] is a human sentiment, common to both sexes.  But fairness, as we have seen, requires a judgment about proportionality:  if people ought to get what they deserve or reciprocate what they receive, then the person evaluating the situation must decide how equal or unequal are the contributions of each party.  If a person greatly values intimacy, community, and mutual esteem, then that person will tend to evaluate the inputs -- the work, effort, time, or manner -- of each party in the group equally. ... when contributions to joint activities are assessed, males will emphasize the differences in inputs to a greater degree than will females.  It does not mean that one gender is more or less fair in its outlook than the other, only that the specific application of the norm of fairness or reciprocity will reflect a different assessment of inputs.  (187-88)

The moral sense of fairness is present in both men and women, but it also seems to be displayed differently, in general, by each.

This observation is important.  It implies, for one thing, something eminently useful.  When conflict between men and women inevitably arises (and it will), we should perhaps pause to ask what legitimate moral sense is being manifested differently by the other person.  The conflict will need to be resolved, but a first step may be to affirm the legitimate moral sense, if one exists, that the other person's words and actions exhibit.  Furnished with this knowledge, we may better iron out the tension.

To say the same thing negatively, we should not so quickly deride another person's approach to a particular subject, since that approach may reflect a different emphasis of the same moral sense as our own.

Women may find this encouraging, because it might lead to less hasty dismissals by men of women's judgments of fairness.

Or, men may find this insight liberating, because it might, if we consider for instance the moral sense of sympathy, dispatch the common perception of men as heartless or unsympathetic simply due to the different ways from women in which they display this virtue.

In fact, I find this discussion of sympathy particularly helpful.  Maybe this is because it seemingly validates my (male) efforts to demonstrate emotional caring by suggesting remedies:  

One can respond to the plight of another by expressions of care or by offers of solutions.  In the first instance, empathy is the goal ("let's share our feelings"), in the latter it is simply a motive ("I can help you fix that"). ... These differences may mean, not that one sex has a greater or lesser capacity for sympathy (though they may mean that), but that people, equally affected by the plight of another, may choose to make either an expressive or an instrumental reaction to it.  (188)

Women tend to react expressively; men, instrumentally.  But both manifest empathy.

~ ~ ~

Although we might be quick to champion our proclivities by pointing out their moral merit, in our actual relationships we should not be too quick to do so.  This is not easy. 

Both comity and love demand that we consider others before we consider ourselves.  The Christian tradition, to highlight one, finds warrant for this ethical approach to others in Jesus' own humility and self-sacrifice.  Indeed, it is one of the great beauties that artists for centuries have attempted to represent in various media, but its finest beauty shines forth in the medium of our lives.

We must be careful, in other words, not to commit two wrongs.  First, we must not ignore or despise the salutary manifestation of a real moral sense in people of the opposite gender just because we might emphasize a different aspect of it.  Fairness and sympathy are only two examples; there are many others.  Second, equipped with a greater awareness of our own prevailing moral sense by its contrast with that of the opposite sex, we must not insist always that our expression is the only correct way to display it.

We avoid these wrongs by, as it happens, being, on the one hand, sympathetic and, on the other, fair.

Virtue manifests itself in action, which when properly practiced by the personal agent can tend to reinforce and exhibit other moral virtue.  It can spark a positive moral feedback loop, just as vice may initiate a downward moral spiral.  Here I have in mind something like Aristotle's formulation of habit.  We maintain and increase in virtue by practicing it, and this habituation produces character.
 
We may appreciate with Aristotle that what we are after is not mere understanding of moral distinctions but our intentional pursuit of virtuous action with the proper knowledge and disposition.  A right understanding of the typically different displays of moral senses across the genders is a necessary aid to our being virtuous in our lives, but it is not sufficient for this end.  And we still need to have prudence in order deliberately, even if by second nature, to tailor our virtuous inclinations to our actual situations.  That prudence, as readers of this blog know, is phronēsis, something we need constantly to nourish, too.

"The operation of prudence," as Robert Bartlett and Susan Collins explain the relationship in Aristotle's view between virtue and practical wisdom, "is limited to the selection of means and is therefore dependent on some prior positing of the correct end" (Nicomachean Ethics, 283).  Or as Aristotle himself puts it, "virtue makes the target correct, prudence the things conducive to the target" (1144a7-9; trans. Bartlett and Collins).  Though distinct, these two things properly go together in Aristotle's estimation:  "we cannot be fully good without prudence, or prudent without the virtue of character" (NE 1144b32-33, trans. Terence Irwin).

~ ~ ~

Whatever we may make of Aristotle on this point, it is surely one thing to recognize moral distinctions.  It is quite another to admit moral correction.  And it is still another to pursue prudence in a given situation.

Although it may be morally legitimate for men to evaluate the individual contributions of a group of people on their merits (fairness as equity), sometimes it may be neither the appropriate nor wise course of action to do so in that particular situation.  Fairness may be the target, but the best means may not necessarily be equitable assessment.  It may be virtuous to express sympathy to another person who is facing a problem, but the practically wise path to that moral goal may not be at that time to suggest a solution to the problem.

But sometimes fairness via equity (rather than via equality) and sympathy via suggested solution (rather than via emotive sharing) are the proper moral ends to express and the prudent conduits to pursue them.  Virtuous -- or, we might just say, loving -- interaction with others, particularly others of the opposite sex, requires not only identifying the moral aim but also the most practically effective accompaniment to secure it.  When these two things walk hand in hand, it is, as Aristotle might say, an example of to kalon, the beautiful.

In the Greek mind, not only objects crafted well but also actions done well are beautiful.  Aesthetics and morals share much in common, including how we commonly refer to them.  A drawing may be a beautiful thing, and so may an act of loving devotion.  Maybe this is why the phrase "a beautiful thing" is used in a paradigmatic male confusion of female virtue.

The Gospel of Mark records in chapter 14 a moving episode of gender-related conflict.  (Actually all of the Gospels narrate a version of this story.)  At a dinner party a woman pours a lot of extremely expensive perfume on Jesus' head.  Some of the men present in the host's home “said to themselves indignantly, 'Why was the ointment wasted like that? For this ointment could have been sold for more than three hundred denarii and given to the poor.' And they scolded her.”

Jesus summarily corrects their interpretation of the event and what was proper:  “Leave her alone. Why do you trouble her? She has done a beautiful thing to me. For you always have the poor with you, and whenever you want, you can do good for them. But you will not always have me. She has done what she could; she has anointed my body beforehand for burial.” 

These men, giving them the benefit of the doubt (although the Fourth Evangelist explicitly does not), had a laudable moral instinct in mind (charity to the downcast), but they did not understand what the occasion called for and what this woman exhibited (advance charity to one who would be downcast).  Maybe the men viewed the action as inequitable (too much "wasted" on one person), whereas she saw it as only fair for her to reciprocate Jesus' unique sacrifice.  This, however, is not clear from the story, and there is a theological pregnancy in the episode that we should not overlook.

What is clear is that these men's confusion about this woman's ends and means, the target and conduit, virtue and prudence, caused the men to miss out on a beautiful thing.

By attending to the different ways in which men and women often exhibit the same virtues, perhaps we can do better than these dinner guests.  When we discern situations that seem to us all the more curious because of gender distinctions, perhaps our moral vision will catch, and our actions will reflect, that which is beautiful.