On the Roman Republic's Decline and U.S. Politics

While I was recently reading relatively new history of the Romans (B. Campbell, The Romans and Their World), I ran across a few passages that resonated as having more than superficial connection to the contemporary western, and especially American, political scene. What made them so vivid was that in the main these passages were quotations or paraphrases of ancient Roman historians themselves.  Let me briefly discuss three of them:  signs of a declining culture (Sallust), lust for personal political power (Florus), and moral descent and civic paralysis (Livy).

Signs of a Declining Culture

One of the passages summarized some key reasons, in the eyes of one ancient Roman observer, Gaius Sallustius Crispus (86 - 35 BCE), that the Roman republic declined into the authoritarian empire. Perhaps because it is presidential election season in the United States, and because the two likely major party nominees strike me as wealthy elitists with more personal ambition than concern for the public welfare, the opinion of Sallust, that the affairs of the res publica became focused less on prudent policies than on popular personalities, is apropos.

Sallust (86 - 35 BCE)

According to the historian Sallust the most important reason for the decline and fall of the traditional form of government in Rome was the grasping greed and personal ambition of members of the ruling class, who selfishly kept the fruits of empire for themselves regardless of the misery of the plebs, and in their ambition to advance personal careers by whatever means were indifferent to the public good. ... Therefore, it is no surprise that a great part of the story of the fall of the Republic is concentrated on the breakdown of consensus among the wealthy and the role of individuals who became predominant often by holding military commands or exploiting popular support.  And people tended to support personality rather than policies or programmes. (Campbell, The Romans and Their World, 64)

Ambition over excellence, personal gain over public good, collapse of civic consensus -- that, Sallust suggests, contributed to the decline of the Roman republic.

Lust for Personal, Political Power

What happens when political candidates do not think that the rules of the state really apply to them? The result is the individual arrogation of privilege in defiance of legal statute and guards.  Moreover, there follows the denial of solidarity with the populace that they ostensibly wish to serve.  Of course, the reality is that such persons wish to gain political office not to serve but to be served, to accrue more wealth, to acquire more power than before or to acquire a new power not previously possessed.  Some candidates in Rome were veteran, wily operatives like Crassus were seeking more power; others were like Caesar whose self-regarding ambition propelled them to acquire political status anew.

They readily agreed to make an assault on the constitution because each had similar desires for power, although Caesar was anxious to achieve status, Crassus to increase his, and Pompey to retain his.  (Lucius Annaeus Florus [74 - 130 CE], Cornelius Nepos 2.13; quoted by Campbell, The Romans and Their World, 78)

Lust over law, pursuit of power over preserving polity -- that, Florus suggests, led to the corrupt collusion and eventually to manifest civil strife.

Moral Descent and Civic Paralysis

The years before Octavian became Augustus were riddled with civil war, political intrigue, betrayals, the public castigating of outspoken opponents (like the senator Cicero), murders (like Cicero's), and programs of propaganda designed to smooth over past and current malfeasance.  Although Livy was aligned with Augustus, Livy prefaces his expansive history Ab Urbe Condita Libri of Rome's progress from it origins through the political revolution and the turn to empire through which he was just living with a candid comment on the predicament of the Roman people:

Titus Livius (59 BCE - 17  CE)

He (the reader) should consider carefully how bit by bit discipline gave way and then how morality first declined and then slipped ever more rapidly before eventually crashing headlong and coming to the present situation when we can endure neither our vices nor their cure. (Livy, I, Preface 9; quoted in Campbell, The Romans and Their World, 94)

The Roman people in many respects traded liberty for security; they exchanged principles and the limiting division of political powers for the limited pleasures of passing peace.  The people were tired of civil war.  They were not fond of the moral degradation of politics, of polarizing figures, of populist rhetoric followed instead by personal gain.  The vices of the res publica had grown unbearable, but then so did the solution to it, which was in reality a solution that was the republic's termination. It was, one might say, the Epicureanism of the republic that resulted in empire.  Private life becomes paramount in the attainment of pleasure.  Pleasure rather than pain should characterize human life. The ultimate good is ataraxia (tranquility).  Republican virtue demands sacrifice. Epicureanism devastated the old civic virtue and private morality. Caesar pledges to keep people safe and happy, but not necessarily by preserving liberty and rule of law.  Public moral declination combined with the citizens' indifference to egregious public statements and acts by politicians to result in those same offensive and unjust politicians' continued acquisition of power.

Ruthless and Relentless: The Center of Political Contradictions

Augustus, as Campbell explains, masterfully merged his respect outwardly for the old institutions with actual transformation and subversion of them:

Ostensibly, he worked within legal forms and republican precedent with a hint of popular appeal, but in reality he was a revolutionary who made a travesty of traditional titles.  In the same way he preserved those parts of traditional electoral practice that suited him while ensuring that he got the right people elected.  Dio summed up the position neatly: "Nothing was done that did not please him" (53.21.6), and this is endorsed by Tacitus: "Up to that time (AD 14) the most important elections were resolved by decision of the emperor" (Annals 1.15).  (Campbell, The Romans and Their World, 98)

Was he a con artist?  Perhaps.  Did he always "try to tell the truth" (whether he meant sincerely to do so or actually did)? Perhaps. Augustus did establish an orderly government, especially in comparison with the tumultuous years of civil war that preceded his rule.  At the same time,

Augustus was ruthless and relentless in the pursuit of power and opposition was crushed, sometimes brutally, as with the judicial murder of the alleged conspirators Primus and Murena in 22 BC. He never resolved the contradictions in his political position. ... Despite the republican framework of government and Augustus' consistently restrained demeanor and outward deference to tradition, he was an autocrat. (Campbell, The Romans and Their World, 100)

Some politicians are outwardly restrained; others are not.  Inwardly, however, the more significant similarities lie between politicians of the first century and those twenty-one centuries later:  they are relentless in their quest for personal gain.  They might mock the handicapped. They might mock pointed questions about destruction of evidence with cloths  even when the recovered digital facts tell otherwise.  Their power, however, prevents significant, sustained, and successful challenges to their statements. One might think of this episode, which Campbell relates:

Augustus's personal demeanor was all-important. ...  when the writer Asinius Pollio was the object of some abusive comments by Augustus, he said, "I'm saying nothing. It's not easy to inscribe lines against a man who can proscribe" (Macrobius, Saturnalia 2.4).  (Campbell, The Romans and Their World, 111-12)

Indeed, ancient as well as contemporary politicians can destroy the careers of others or worse.  It is to Augustus's credit, however, that, although he possessed the power to proscribe, those closest to him, indeed those protecting him, did not generally think that he was a nightmare with whom to work.

M. Tullius Cicero (106 - 43 BCE)

Before Octavian acquiesced to his triumvirate colleagues Mark Antony and Lepidus to proscribe/execute him in 43 BCE, Marcus Tullius Cicero was a well-respected, eloquent senator who contributed greatly to state political life. In the summer of 64 BCE he was campaigning to be elected consul.  At the time it was the highest office in the republic. (It was also shared with a second consul as a check on power.)  His brother Quintus penned Marcus a letter of election strategy, which rich with enduring practical advice.  Consider, for instance, this not-to-be-overlooked counsel: "There are three things that will guarantee votes in an election:  favors, hope, and personal attachment. You must work to give these incentives to the right people" (Q. Tullius Cicero, How to Win an Election [trans. Philip Freeman; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012], 33).

Pandering has been perennial:  "You can win uncommitted voters to your side by doing them even small favors" (33).

Parallel justice systems for the well-heeled should be used as a political asset.  One might think, for instance, of the opening office scene in The Godfather when Bonasera the undertaker asks Vito to exercise certain private retributive justice against a man who spoiled and physically abused his daughter:

Don Corleone: We have known each other many years, but this is the first time you've come to me for counsel or for help. I can't remember the last time you invited me to your house for a cup of coffee, even though my wife is godmother to your only child. But let's be frank here. You never wanted my friendship. And you feared to be in my debt.
Bonasera: I didn't want to get into trouble.
Don Corleone: I understand. You found paradise in America. You had a good trade, you made a good living. The police protected you and there were courts of law. So you didn't need a friend like me. Now you come and say, "Don Corleone, give me justice." But you don't ask with respect. You don't offer friendship. You don't even think to call me "Godfather." You come into my house on the day my daughter is to be married and you ask me to do murder -- for money.
Bonasera: I ask you for justice.
Don Corleone: That is not justice. Your daughter is alive.
Bonasera: Let them suffer then as she suffers.

[the Don is silent]

Bonasera: How much shall I pay you?

[the Don turns away dismissively, but Bonasera stays on]

Don Corleone: Bonasera, Bonasera, what have I ever done to make you treat me so disrespectfully? If you'd come to me in friendship, this scum who ruined your daughter would be suffering this very day. And if by some chance an honest man like yourself made enemies they would become my enemies. And then, they would fear you.

Bonasera: Be my friend... Godfather.

[the Don at first shrugs, but upon hearing the title he lifts his hand, and a humbled Bonasera kisses the ring on it]

Don Corleone: Good.

[He places his hand around Bonasera in a paternal gesture]

Don Corleone: Some day, and that day may never come, I will call upon you to do a service for me. But until that day, consider this justice a gift on my daughter's wedding day.

[a gratified Bonasera offers his thanks and leaves]

Don Corleone: [to Hagen] Give this job to Clemenza. I want reliable people, people who aren't going to be carried away. I mean, we're not murderers, in spite of what this undertaker thinks...

I do not think it is merely because of the Italian connection that Quintus tells Marcus: "Remember also those men who owe you favors because you defended their interests successfully in court. Make it clear to each one under obligation to you exactly what you expect from him. Remind them that you have never asked anything of them before, but now is the time to make good on what you owe" (33). Patron-client relationships embedded in Roman civic life were just as much the blood that coursed through and animated political advancement.  It also resulted in travesties of justice, prejudiced administrative or court decisions  -- for example, to dismiss charges or not to bring charges at all based on a pretext such as lack of intent to violate the law.  (I do not recall a police officer ever asking me on the side of the road whether I intended to speed before he wrote me a ticket. I also do not think that Bill Clinton and Attorney General Lynch met days before the FBI's e-mail investigation recommendations merely to discuss grandchildren and golf; apparently neither do a number of FBI agents.) So there was a willingness to circumvent the law.  After all, Quintus reminds Marcus, "fear works even better than actual litigation" (83).

The split between public and private is key, and showmanship -- if there were party nominating conventions in ancient Rome this would have been on display -- is critical to garner votes when politics became increasingly about personalities.  Quintus recognized this and summarized much of his advice about winning an election in this way:

You must always think about publicity.  I've been talking about this throughout my whole letter, but it is vital that you use all of your assets to spread the word about your campaign to the widest possible audience.  Your ability as a public speaker is key, as is the support of the business community and those who carry out public contracts.  Need I mention again the backing of the nobility, the brightest young people, those you have defended in court, and the leaders of the Italian towns?  Having these groups behind you will cause the populace to think you are well connected, have many important friends, are a hardworking candidate, and that you are a gracious and generous person.  This will fill your house with supporters of every kind before sunrise.  To these you should say whatever is necessary to please them as you labor endlessly to win the votes of all. (75-77)

From the signs of a declining culture (Sallust), lust for personal political power (Florus), moral descent and civic paralysis (Livy), and the pragmatic if not scrupulous requirements to win an election (Quintus Tullius Cicero to his brother Marcus), we have seen elements at work in Roman personal, moral, judicial, and civic culture. Over time, all of these led to (1) the assertions of autonomy by the wealthy, political elite, (2) the resigned indifference by the population at large to autocratic overreach, violations of justice, and (3) polarizing opinion as consensus not only broke down but was devalued.  I hear echoes of that in today's United States culture and politics. For Rome it was characteristic of and contributed to the decline and eventual disintegration of the republic.