Revisiting Just War Theory

On August 11, Jean Bethke Elshtain passed away after a remarkable academic career.  I first became familiar with her work some years ago while working on a term paper for an ethics course.  The subject of the paper was whether violence in defense of justice was ever legitimate.  Professor Elshtain wrote with vigor and clarity on just war theory and its application to contemporary geopolitical problems.  Both in honor of her passing and in view of the current debate in the United States about a potential military strike on Syria (President Obama intends to address his nation during prime time tomorrow), I thought it worthwhile to revisit the criteria for determining the legitimate use of violence in defense of justice that she helped to refine.

Of course, there is an ethical strain of pacifism that will reject (and has rejected) the just war tradition that Elshtain and others defended.  My point is not to settle here the question whether violence is ever justified.  The foreign policy debate in the U.S. is not falling out along pacifist versus non-pacifist lines.  Non-pacifism is assumed by U.S. government officials.  So, my point is, rather, to catalog the tests that must be satisfied according to the most standard view of just war theory in order for use of force to be deemed legitimate.

First, there are two governing concepts of just war theory:

1. jus ad bellum (lit., "justice toward war"):  just grounds for having recourse for going to just war
2. jus in bello (lit., "justice in war"):  the just waging of that just war, i.e., just conduct

Each of these is necessary for a war to be just; neither by itself is sufficient for a war to be just.  You cannot, for instance, be justified in going to war but behave reprehensibly in your conduct of the war and still call the war just.  Both concepts must be satisfied.

Second, then, what are the conditions of jus ad bellum, that is, the set of conditions that justify resort to war.  Although the number of conditions proposed for jus ad bellum may vary, usually included are the following (which I have adapted from a fine short article by Robert L. Holmes): 

     (1)  just cause:  an actual or imminent wrong against the state;

     (2)  competent authority:  declared only by state’s legitimate rulers;

     (3)  right intention:  aiming at peace and only the ends of the just cause;

     (4)  proportionality:  ensuring anticipated benefits/good outweigh costs/bad;

     (5)  last resort; and

     (6)  probability of success.   

The conditions of jus in bello, the second aspect of just war theory, are intrinsically contained within the conditions of jus ad bellum.  A just war is waged justly when it takes into account:

     (7)  proportionality (see #4 above) and, related, 

     (8)  discrimination:  prohibiting killing of noncombatants or innocents.

To repeat, each of these enumerated criteria is necessary for a just war; none is sufficient.

The fogginess that clouds war being what it is, determining whether these requirements have been met in a given real-world conflict is not always easy.  The matter of "success," for example, will likely be debated.  What is the "competent authority" whose permission must be obtained?  What is the real "last resort"?  Is the stated intention the real intention, and is the real intention the "right intention"?  And what is a proportional response to an injustice, if all human life is invaluable?

For all of her defense of the just war tradition and its ongoing contemporary relevance, even in wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. nearly a dozen year ago, Jean Bethke Elshtain reflected personally the self-restraint that, in its ideal and best expressions, the just war theory was designed to promote.  It may be legitimate to employ violence in defense of justice, but nations should rarely be hasty, and never eager, to exercise this option.